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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Admiralty-Limitations on the Sieracki Doctrine
In Seas Shipping Co., Inc. v. Sierackil plaintiff-stevedore was in-
jured while in the process of loading cargo into a ship. As a result,
he subsequently sought to recover for his damages from the operator
of the ship on the theory of unseaworthiness. 2 Theretofore the ship and
her operator had been held liable to a seaman who was injured by reason
of the unseaworthiness of the vessel.3 The Supreme Court held, how-
ever, that liability for unseaworthiness was not limited to seamen but
was available as well to persons who did a seaman's work irrespective
of whether such persons were hired directly by the shipowner, through
his consent, or by his arrangement. Doing a seaman's work was said to
incur a seaman's risks for which a seaman would be entitled to a sea-
worthy ship. Since the loading and unloading of a ship's cargo was
"historically" the work of the crew, plaintiff was allowed to recover.
Mr. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the dissent, thought the doc-
trine of unseaworthiness was applicable to seamen only. There is much
to be said for the dissent's hypothesis. At least the risks incurred while
loading a ship are not those "historically" categorized as "perils of the
sea" 4 nor such that might render a ship unseaworthy to the extent that
the crew had a right to abandon it.5
The Sieracki "historical" doctrine was restated and affirmed in Pope
& Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn.6 There the shipowner's duty to furnish a
seaworthy ship was extended to an employee of a refitting company who
was injured while aboard doing carpentry work. It appeared after
this decision that any land servant who came aboard a ship to perform
any work would be entitled to a seaworthy ship because it would seem
that all shipboard labor was "historically" traceable to the crew.
1328 U.S. 85 (1946).
' "The test of seaworthiness is whether the vessel is reasonably fit to carry the
cargo which she has undertaken to transport." The Silvia, 171 U.S. 462, 464(1898). Spencer Kellogg & Sons v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., 32 F. Supp. 520(E.D. Mich. 1940). In McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221(1958), it was stated that unseaworthiness did not necessarily mean the entire ship
must be unfit, but that the ship was considered unseaworthy if any part of it was
unseaworthy, as where a ladder step was defective.
'The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
'"[S]omething so catastrophic as to triumph over those safeguards by which
skillful and vigilant seamen usually bring ship and cargo to port in safety." The
Rosalia, 264 Fed. 285, 288 (2d Cir. 1920).
'The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 121 n. 2 (1936).0346 U.S. 406 (1953).
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Apparently, the Sieracki doctrine has been limited by two recent
decisions decided the same day by the Supreme Court. In the first,
The Tungus v. Skovgaard,7 an action for wrongful death, based jointly
upon negligence and unseaworthiness,8 was brought under the New
Jersey wrongful death statute.9 The district court had dismissed the
suit.10 The court of appeals reversed,"' and the Supreme Court affirmed
this reversal.
Historically, there was no survival of a right of action where the
death was caused by unseaworthiness.' 2  After passage of the Jones
Act 13 and the Death on the High Seas Act, 14 this anomaly was wiped
away. Both of these acts established rights in certain classes of sur-
vivors. Jones applies to deaths and injuries which occur on any navi-
gable water but is restricted to members of the crew.' 5  Therefore, no
land servant, regardless of the nature of his work, is covered by its
provisions. The Death on the High Seas Act, as the name implies, is
applicable only to deaths which occur more than a marine league from
the shore although it is unrestricted as to persons covered. Its pro-
visions are available to the survivors of a land servant, then, only if
the death occurs more than three miles offshore. Consequently, sur-
vivors of a land servant who chanced death within the territorial waters
of a state upon an unseaworthy ship can recover only if they have a
remedy under the state's wrongful death statute. Such statutes had
previously been held to supply a remedy in admiralty for the survivors
of a person killed upon the navigable waters' 6 of the state under a theory
7358 U.S. 588 (1959).
'In Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928), it was held a seaman
had to elect to sue either under a theory of negligence or a theory of unseaworthi-
ness. However, in McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958),
it was held that a seaman need not elect but if he sued under both theories, he must
do so in the same suit because the two were not separate causes of action but
alternative causes. Therefore, there could be but one recovery for the one injury.
In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, stupra, a suit under a joint theory was held valid
for the non-seagoing type of seaman as well.9 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 31-1.
"o Skovgaard v. The Tungus, 141 F. Supp. 653 (D.N.J. 1956). The court held
that the unseaworthiness action did not lie. The negligence cause was also dis-
missed on the ground that no duty of exercising ordinary care to provide a safe
place to work was owed the deceased by the shipowner.
'Skovgaard v. The Tungus, 252 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1957). It was held the
district court had erred with respect to the unseaworthiness count and with respect
to the shipowner's duty to use reasonable care for the deceased's safety.
" Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930).1841 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
1 41 STAT. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761-67 (1952).15Obrecht-Lynch Corp. v. Clark, 30 F.2d 144 (D.C. Md. 1929).
"Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in the substantive sense can be stated
in terms of waters. Events must occur on certain waters in order to be within
the general jurisdiction in tort." RoBiNsoN, ADmiRALry § 6 at 31 (1939). "Thus
to the question, what waters are within the admiralty jurisdiction so that events
occurring on them may have cognizance in admiralty courts, the answer is, all
[Vol. 37
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of negligence,17 but a recovery under a theory of unseaworthiness had
not been attempted. It appeared the Court was urged to incorporate
(without state-imposed conditions) the state created remedy into the
federal maritime law to make effective the federal cause of action and
to adhere to the doctrine of uniformity.' 8
The majority, relying on The Harrisburg,"O rejected this argument,
in part at least. They took the view that when admiralty adopts a state
created statutory remedy, it can only enforce the remedy within the
jurisdictional limits attached by the creating state. Therefore it had to
be determined whether the New Jersey act had incorporated the federal
maritime law and thus embraced a cause of action for unseaworthiness.
The court of appeals' resolution of this question in the affirmative was
upheld notwithstanding the fact that New Jersey's own courts had never
considered it.
Four members of the Court concurred in the result but dissented
from the reasoning. Their opinion, by Mr. Justice Brennan, stresses the
incongruity of applying state law where death occurs but having to apply
the federal admiralty law where an injury is non-fatal. That admiralty
substantive law must be applied to admiralty causes wherever they are
heard and whether the remedy is maritime in nature only or known also
to the law courts is a well known admiralty doctrine.2 0  But since the
remedy for wrongful death is solely statutory, it would seem that the
enacting sovereign could burden or limit the right to the remedy as it
saw fit. Therefore despite the admonitions of the minority opinion, it
is difficult to discern why the federal courts may not look to the state
law in an effort to discover whether the statutory right to recover for
wrongful death has been limited or encumbered in any manner.
Originally, Sieracki endowed non-seagoing "seamen" with a sub-
waters whether fresh or salt, tidal or non-tidal, which are navigable in fact ..
Id. at 33.
"'The Corsair, 145 U.S. 335 (1892).
" "One thing... is unquestionable; the Constitution must have referred to a
system of law ... operating uniformly in, the whole country." The Lottawanna,
88 U.S. 558, 575 (1874). "Article III, § 2, of the Constitution extends the judicial
power of the United States 'To all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;'
and Article I, § 8, confers upon the Congress power 'To make all laws which may
be necessary and proper . . . .' Considering our former opinions, it must now be
accepted as settled doctrine that in consequence of these provisions Congress
has paramount power to fix and determine the maritime law which shall prevail
throughout the country." Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 214, 215(1917). "But the grant presupposed 'a general system of maritime law' . . . and
contemplated a body of law with uniform operation.' Detroit Trust Co. v. The
Thomas Barium, 293 U.S. 21, 43 (1934).
' 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
"In the case at bar, plaintiff has sought his remedy at common law to obtain
redress arising out of a maritime tort He entered the common-law court with the
same right as he would have entered the admiralty court." Port of New York
Stevedoring Corp. v. Castagna, 280 Fed. 618, 624 (C.C.A.N.Y. 1922). But cf.
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., Inc., 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
1959]
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stantive right to recover for injuries caused by the unseaworthy condi-
tion of a ship. The next logical step would have been the vesting in
non-seagoing "seamen's" survivors a maritime susbtantive right to
recover for deaths caused by the unseaworthiness of a ship. For the
reasons previously mentioned, however, the Court refused to take this
step. Whether such a substantive right does exist is a matter of statu-
tory interpretation of state law rather than an inherent mandate of the
admiralty law.
In the second recent case, United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots
Ass'n v. Halecki,21 the plaintiff also sued under the New Jersey wrongful
death statute, also employed a joint theory of negligence and unseaworth-
iness, and also saw the Court split 5-4, arraying itself identically as it had
in Skovgaard. Mr. Justice Stewart again wrote for the majority and
Mr. Justice Brennan for the minority which this time dissented totally.
Unlike Skovgaard, which did not get beyond the pleadings, Halecki
proceeded to the merits. While Skovgaard limited Sieracki by making
wrongful death recovery by survivors of Sieracki-type "seamen" de-
pendent on.state law, Halecki imposed a direct limitation on Sieracki by
narrowing the class of land servants entitled to seaworthiness protec-
tion.
The decedent had been an employee of a sub-contractor hired by a
shipyard to spray a ship's generators with carbon tetrachloride. Death
was caused by carbon tetrachloride poisoning. It was stated in the
majority opinion that seaworthiness was an absolute, non-delegable
right owed by a shipowner to his crew.2 The Sieracki doctrine was
said to mean a shipowner could not escape liability for unseaworthiness
by contracting to non-seamen work "traditionally" done by the crew.
The substitution of "traditionally" for "historically," as used in Sieracki,
may have significance.2
Reversing the decision for plaintiff below, it was held the decedent
was not performing work "traditionally" performed by the crew. Four
arguments were put forth to support the holding. First, the work could
only be performed when the generators were dismantled and the ship
was "dead" as opposed to a condition of readiness for sea. Historically,
21358 U.S. 613 (1959).
" The Edwin I. Morrison, 153 U.S. 199 (1894), Globe S.S. Co. v. Moss, 245
Fed. 54 (6th Cir. 1917). See Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944),
where this duty was held to be unaffected by the fact "that the negligence of the
officers of the vessel contributed to its unseaworthiness." Also, Boudoin v. Lykes
Bros. S.S. Co., Inc., 348 U.S. 336 (1954), where the vicious disposition of a seaman
caused the ship to become unseaworthy bringing liability upon the shipowner for
the injuries inflicted upon a fellow-seaman.
2In MERRIAm-WEBsTER NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1959),
"historical" is defined as being: "Of, pertaining to, or of the nature of, history;
as historical truth; narrating, dealing with, or based upon history . . . " "Tradi-
tional" is defined as: "Following or conforming to tradition, or the order, code,
practice, etc., accepted from the past; conventional, long established . . . "
[Vol. 37
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however, whether the ship was "dead" or not, it seems the crew was
responsible for the maintenance of the propulsion and power units, at
least in the days of sails and whale oil. Further, there seems to be no
tradition that work on a dead ship necessarily be farmed out.
Second, the decedent was a specialist using special skills and equip-
ment of which none was connected directly with a ship's seagoing opera-
tions. But if a generator is so important, as it obviously is, to the func-
tioning of a ship that the ship is dead and not ready for sea when the
generator is disassembled, it is difficult to understand how the skill or
tools used to maintain it could be anything but directly connected with
seagoing operations.
Third, it was said the work was of such a dangerous nature it was
necessary to perform it on a week-end when only a minimum of the crew
was aboard. Historically, again, it appears danger was no criterion for
determining what was considered the work of the crew nor for deciding
what work should be farmed out.
Fourth, quoting from the dissent below, it was said the decedent
"was not doing what any crew member had ever done on this ship or
anywhere else in the world so far as we are informed. '24  Such work
is not "traditionally" done by the crew today or ever. This ground
appears to be the strongest of the four. In fact it appears to be beyond
refutation. There is no "tradition" in the maritime service to spray the
generators with carbon tetrachloride irrespective of any historical back-
ground for preservation of the propulsion and power units.
Obviously the Court was attempting to ease the swing of the door
flung open by the Sieracki and Pope & Talbot cases. But whatever may
be said in criticism of those cases, their doctrine was manifestly positive.
Anyone who performed work on a ship or its gear was entitled to a
seaworthy ship due to the virtual impossibility of preventing some his-
torical linkage between the work and the crew. However, there can
be no "tradition" in mechanical innovations. Consequently, it seems
a ship could become so modem that tradition would remain only in its
floating in water. If this be the purport of Halecki, it would seem that
the operation of Sieracki has been seriously limited. If the distinction
lies in the degree of specialization required for the work, vexing fact
questions arise which could lead to either arbitrariness or an importation
of a doctrine into this area approximating the very unreliable "twilight
zone." 25 If the case be limited to its facts, its doctrine would only be
"' Halecki v. United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n, 251 F.2d 708, 715(2d Cir. 1958).
"'Davis v. Department of Labor and Indus. of Wash., 317 U.S. 249 (1942),
where it was stated that an effort under certain conditions to determine whether a
stevedore or harbor worker was covered by a state workmen's compensation act
or the federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat.
1424, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1927), might be unrewarded because "There is ...
1959]
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applicable where extremely dangerous specialized work is being per-
formed on a dead ship.
The dissenters complained the Sieracki doctrine had been inverted
by the majority so that a shipowner can escape his duties relative to sea-
worthiness by contracting the dangerous work to non-seamen. Modern
ships are outfitted with modem equipment, and contracting out the
dangerous maintenance work on such equipment has become the estab-
lished practice. Further, the Halecki doctrine would introduce con-
fusion. Who can tell what is traditional?
Whatever might have been the purpose behind the majority opinion,.
and the most cogent seems to be the substitution of the old "historical"
test for a new "traditional" test, the dissent seems to have the better
of the argument-at least to the extent that a rather definite standard
has been traded for a somewhat nebulous one. Halecki has created
a new area of confusion in a once certain field of the law already fraught
with indecisiveness in other areas.
Guy C. EVANS
Contracts-Liability of Minor Upon Disaffirmance
The policy of North Carolina has been to cloak an infant with a
mantle of protection in his contract dealings with adults by allowing
him to disaffirm his contracts for personalty1 either before2 or within
a reasonable time after3 attaining his majority. The dominant purpose
justifying this principle is to protect the minor from his own improvi-
dence or want of discretion, and from the wiles of designing adults.
4
The disaffirmance when made is irrevocable,3 voids the contract ab
initio,6 and entitles the infant to a return of any consideration passing
from him, either in specie or its equivalent ;7 but the infant, unless he has
the consideration within his possession or control, is not required to
place the other party in status quo ante.8
clearly a twilight zone in which the employees must have their rights determined
case by case, and in which particular facts and circumstances are vital elements."
Id. at 256.
'An infant's deed of realty can be neither disaflirmed nor ratified before he
attains his majority. McCormic v. Leggett, 53 N.C. 425 (1862).
'Hight v. Harris, 188 N.C. 328, 124 S.E. 623 (1924).
'Coker v. Virginia-Carolina Joint-Stock Land Bank, Inc., 208 N.C. 41, 178 S.E.
863 (1935). The infant is liable for personal necessities if the contract price is
reasonable. Barger v. M. & J. Fin. Corp., 221 N.C. 64, 18 S.E.2d 826 (1942);
Hyman v. Cain, 48 N.C. 111 (1855); Smith v. Young, 19 N.C. 26 (1836). Cer-
tain contracts are permitted by statute. See N.C. GEir. STAT. § 39-4 (1950).
'McCormick v. Crotts, 198 N.C. 664, 153 S.E. 152 (1930).
Pippen v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 130 N.C. 23, 40 S.E. 822 (1902).
Coker v. Virginia-Carolina Joint-Stock Land Bank, Inc., 208 N.C. 41, 178
S.E. 863 (1935).
" Collins v. Norfleet-Baggs, Inc., 197 N.C. 659, 150 S.E. 177 (1929).
' Faircloth v. Johnson, 189 N.C. 429, 127 S.E. 346 (1925). Accord, Bell v.
[Vol. 37
